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We propose a simple, yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of 
monetary economics. It comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that 
expand within and across these fields. The elements of our scheme are not found 
together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature, 
neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization. Our 
intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness. We rather suggest a 
viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge. Our hope is to 
stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency 
of monetary economics at large. 
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“The beauty of economics as an intellectual pursuit is its position at the intersection of formal 
theory, statistical analysis, and human events – coupled with its ultimate potential to improve 
peoples’ everyday lives. A master economist must assume away the distracting inessential 
details of a situation in the interest of mathematical clarity. At the same time, he or she must 
see how relevant subtleties may affect the interpretation of the data and the applicability of 
different models in real life. Because the ultimate policy decisions at stake are so complex, 
with such vast potential to do harm or good in the world, economics (and especially 




Monetary economics links closely with macroeconomics and it is both ultimately 
policy-oriented and perpetually unsettled. We here take stock of our current 
understanding of this particular subject area in its relation to the seminal papers of the 
past as well as the most promising avenues for future research. Moreover, our purpose 
is to propose a compact systematic classification scheme of monetary economics by 
main field and method of study. We hope that such a condensed and ordered 
restatement of the key themes and findings of earlier and recent work in monetary 
analysis would be useful in placing in perspective the essentials of our knowledge to 
date and the priorities for further inquiry. 
There appears to be no commonly agreed or used explicit classification of monetary 
economics. The Journal of Economic Literature codes include monetary economics 
within macroeconomics at large, and separately from international, financial, or public 
economics. The Handbook of Monetary Economics (1990) edited by Friedman and 
Hahn, in two volumes, employs the following headings for the eight parts delineated 
in its structure: (1) money in the Walrasian economy, (2) money in non-Walrasian 
settings, (3) money in dynamic settings, (4) money demand and money supply, (5) 
pricing non-money assets, (6) money, other assets, and economic activity, (7) money, 
inflation and welfare, (8) monetary policy. In the preface to the handbook the editors 
begin by stating: “Monetary economics has always represented a symbiosis, albeit at 
times an uncomfortable one, between a priori theorizing and the development and 
exploitation of empirical evidence” (p. xi). They continue to embed this particular 
field, denoted as “formal theory describing an economy with money, and perhaps Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 4 
other financial instruments” (p. xi), within the deeper structures of utility 
maximization and economic equilibrium, pointing to the tension (‘handicap’ in their 
words) arising because it has turned out difficult to accommodate money with general 
equilibrium. Stressing the interaction between theory and evidence, they also insist 
that it is hardly possible to separate these two aspects of monetary economics from a 
third one, of implicit or explicit evaluation of “actual policies carried out in the past 
or, correspondingly, judgments about potential future policies” (p. xi). Walsh’s (2003) 
textbook on monetary theory and policy does not offer a uniform classification either, 
listing eleven chapters that are not organized in bulkier units. Woodford’s (2003) 
treatise on the theory of monetary policy suggests a grouping of its eight chapters into 
two parts called respectively ‘analytical framework’ and ‘monetary policy’, but the 
focus in Woodford (2003) is in the narrower area of monetary policy, not the broader 
one of monetary economics. 
The present synthetic contribution, therefore, seeks to propose a simple but also more 
structured and sufficiently encompassing classification that provides an overall 
perspective on monetary economics. We begin by elaborating on our scheme in the 
section that follows. 
2. A Compact Classification Scheme of Monetary Economics 
Our compact systematization of the monetary literature here focuses on three 
fundamental fields and six recent areas of work that expand within and across these 
fields. Neither the core fields nor the current trends we choose to highlight are found – 
at least altogether and in their relation among themselves – in earlier surveys of this 
literature. We visualize and streamline our discussion in what follows around a central 
diagram we now introduce, in Figure 1, which may be called a ‘field-method map’ of 
monetary economics. On this ‘extended’ Venn diagram, we first identify what we 
think are the three major fields/methods of monetary inquiry. We then summarize and 
evaluate, in turn, the ingredient subfields, topics and approaches in both what 
constitutes the more ‘traditional’ research (the three intersecting circles in Figure 1) 
and those of the ‘innovative’ extensions on the agenda nowadays that all hold the 
promise of a great potential (the six rectangles in the right-hand side of the same 
figure). We make clear the structure of the diagram, illustrating our main points, as 
this survey progresses on. With the help of Figure 1, we offer in the next sections a 
tour across monetary economics, revisiting the key issues and results as understood at Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 5 
the turn of the millennium. This intellectual tour mostly focuses on some recurrent 
themes, at the same time expounding the basic terminology and delimiting the 
constituent elements of our proposed classification. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
With some prudent risk of oversimplifying and from perhaps the broadest perspective 
possible, one could identify, define or demarcate the subject area of ‘monetary 
economics’ as consisting of three fundamental fields that have traditionally occupied 
the interest of researchers (see the intersecting circles constituting the Venn diagram 
of Figure 1). We would call these three core fields as follows: monetary theory; 
monetary policy; and public finance. The numbering at this first-digit level in the 
diagram is rather arbitrary, although at the next, double-digit level (i.e. within each 
circle in Figure 1) it is intended to be roughly indicative of the chronology of the 
respective theories or approaches. Our distinction among the three core fields is based 
on the main issues of inquiry and the key techniques of analysis involved. The 
rationale for unifying these three fields under the label of monetary economics is that 
they all treat somewhat autonomous yet interrelated aspects of the same grand topic, 
namely, (general or macroeconomic) equilibrium in (models of) monetary economies. 
The common ground of all three fundamental fields from a theoretical viewpoint is 
that each tries to rationalize – i.e. to microfound, in a more modern language – an 
aspect of the demand for or supply of money or of the role of government policy in 
attempting to achieve certain socially desirable outcomes by partially controlling, by 
force of legislation, the money supply process. 
The definition for monetary theory we would maintain throughout thus involves 
rationalizing and microfounding money itself as well as its demand in positive 
quantities by economic agents. Monetary policy, by contrast, will have to provide 
rationale and microfoundations to the supply of money and the unique role of the 
central bank in affecting it.
1 Public finance will have to rationalize and microfound 
the broader intervention of the government into the market mechanism: mostly fiscal 
policy in addition to monetary policy, but also other, structural (or supply-side) and 
social security policies. The main reason for linking monetary-fiscal (and other 
                                                 
1 What is suggested in the text becomes obvious once the ideas in favor of free banking have 
historically ceded to the alternative of monopoly of note issue, granted by law to a non-profit-
maximizing monetary authority acting in the national interest. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 6 
public) policies is that the consolidated general government would have to 
(eventually) comply with a common intertemporal budget constraint, such as those 
also faced – more tightly – by any other economic entity.
2 Moreover, as Samuelson 
(1958) and Diamond (1965) have demonstrated, the function of money as a store of 
value  alone is sufficient for monetary policy to affect equilibrium allocations of 
resources, even assuming away any other functions (e.g. medium of exchange or unit 
of account) or services (such as liquidity) that money is also assigned to fulfill. 
The three intersecting circles define a total area with seven regions. The unique 
central region where all three circles intersect represents topics and approaches that 
are pertinent to all three core fields. The three other regions where distinct pairs of 
the three circles intersect identify topics and approaches that are common to only two 
of the fundamental fields of monetary economics. Finally, the three regions with no 
intersection denote relatively autonomous territories of monetary (and fiscal) inquiry. 
Of course, the proposed classification is meant to be illustrative and, hopefully, 
convenient in offering an overall perspective on monetary economics, but with no 
claims for either exhaustiveness or high precision. 
The six rectangles drawn to intersect the monetary policy and public finance circles in 
the right-hand side of Figure 1 are, rather, intended to be of relevance to all three core 
fields, including monetary theory proper. Their role in the diagram is to identify and 
(approximately) label six major recent trends in extending the ‘traditional’ area of 
monetary theory and policy to ‘novel’ issues and/or methods. Our focus later on will 
be precisely on these innovative approaches that update recurrent themes from past 
studies. But before moving to the present state of research, it would be useful to 
motivate and link in some systematic way the ingredients of the three circles of 
fundamental knowledge in monetary economics. 
In structuring the paper we keep in line with the plan implicit in Figure 1. 
Accordingly, section 3 outlines the fundamental fields of monetary economics; 
section 4, in turn, discusses some important extensions in ongoing research; and 
                                                 
2 Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006) define money and monetary policy as well as their link with fiscal 
policy in a similar way: “Money is a store of value that serves as a unit of account and medium of 
exchange. Monetary policy is the conduct of the monetary authority in the issuance and supply of 
money balances.” Further down on the same page they stress that “it is not possible to consider 
monetary distinct from fiscal policy, and this is because of the accounting consistency required by 
general equilibrium: alternative specifications of the distribution of seignorage have different 
implications for the determinacy of equilibria, akin to the distinction, Woodford (1994), between 
Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies” (p. 1). Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 7 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. Within each circle of traditional issues or 
rectangle of novel trends, we try to keep track – insofar possible and where relevant – 
of three aspects, namely, the most common (i) rationale, (ii) methods, and (iii) 
findings. 
3. Fundamental Fields of Monetary Economics 
The usual approach in most of monetary economics is to ignore or, rather, subsume 
the public finance literature within either or both of the remaining two core fields in 
our diagram. This would give rise to a grand field that can be denoted microfounded 
macroeconomics or general equilibrium with money. Various authors have recently 
termed versions of the fundamental fields we suggested in different ways.
3 Yet the 
precise concepts involved are not that crucial. What is more important is the apparent 
consolidation on how to split the broad domain of monetary economics into two 
subfields, theory and policy. We would instead prefer to treat here public finance as a 
distinct, third core field, often constituting in fact the intersection of the other two. 
3.1 Monetary Theory 
Looking first at monetary theory and applying a criterion of distinction that is both 
historical and methodological (or analytical) in nature, the major strands of literature 
could be classified in (at least) five approaches, explicit in the double-digit numbering 
in circle 1 of Figure 1. 
Classical models of money demand comprise one such approach. Fisher (1911) first 
postulated and Friedman (1956) extended (1.1 in the diagram) such models, which led 
to the several versions of the quantity theory of money (QTM). These would be the 
earliest more or less well-specified models of money, although very much ad-hoc 
themselves. 
Keynesian models of money demand, implicit in Keynes (1936) and developed more 
formally by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956, 1958), adding bonds as an alternative 
                                                 
3 For example, our monetary theory circle in the diagram is referred to as ‘models of money that meet 
certain a prori desiderata’ (p. 847) or also ‘matching models of money’ (p. 851) in Wallace (2001), 
‘basic literature’ (p. 715) in Kocherlakota (2005), and simply ‘money’ (p. 1) in Bloise and 
Polemarchakis (2006). Our monetary policy core field is then called by the same authors, respectively, 
‘money-is-productive models’ (p. 847), ‘applied literature’ (p. 715) and ‘monetary policy’ (p. 1). The 
literature Kocherlakota (2005) classifies under the label ‘applied’ is not such in the usual sense, but the 
‘theory’ in it does involve ‘shortcuts’ (p. 847), in the words of Wallace (2001), or ‘simplifying 
assumptions’ (p. 2), in the milder qualification of Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006). Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 8 
asset to money and highlighting the role of the interest rate and transactions-
technology costs (1.2 in Figure 1), are a second recurrent theme. Since these models 
allow for bonds, they are accounted for in our diagram in the intersecting region of 
monetary theory and public finance. 
Models of money in general equilibrium (GE) with only (net) lump-sum transfers 
available have constituted a third field of research (1.3 in Figure 1), out of which the 
so-called Friedman (1969) rule has come out as a rather robust result. The Friedman 
rule says that the optimal policy (in such model contexts) would be to equalize the 
return on money and other assets by setting the nominal interest rate to zero and 
aiming at a mild deflation, thus guaranteeing a positive real interest rate. Chari, 
Christiano and Kehoe (1996) and Correia and Teles (1996, 1999) have further shown 
that Friedman’s rule remains optimal even to extensions allowing for distortionary 
taxes in the absence of lump-sum transfers.
4 Moreover, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 
(1996) have found it robust to three popular environments of modeling money, 
namely, those of Sidrauski (1967), assuming money balances entering the utility 
function, Kimbrough (1986), assuming a shopping-time model to motivate money, 
and Lucas and Stokey (1987) assuming a model with cash (hence, cash-in-advance 
constraint) and credit goods. Since Friedman’s rule qualifies, in essence, what optimal 
monetary-fiscal policy should be, the literature of that kind is considered to occupy 
the intersection of the three fundamental fields in Figure 1. This central core of our 
diagram is, in that sense, perhaps the most relevant – or legitimate – subject-matter of 
monetary economics properly understood. 
The same could be said of the type of models (1.4 in Figure 1) attempting to 
rationalize through shortcuts, yet not out of more primitive microfoundations, money 
in GE. Hahn (1965) has notably argued that money is redundant in real competitive 
GE because money cannot maintain a positive price. Since then, it has been hard to 
find and prove formally a role for money in such models. In monetary models that 
developed in response to Hahn’s conundrum – e.g. by Clower (1967), involving a 
cash-in-advance (CiA) constraint, or by Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1974, 1975), 
relying on a money-in-the-utility (MiU) function assumption – (i) transaction-
technology costs (such as CiA or in the Keynesian tradition of Baumol, 1952 – Tobin, 
1956, or, later, in Prescott, 1987) or (ii) shopping-time costs (where money and time 
                                                 
4 Phelps (1973) has noted that Friedman’s rule may hinge exactly on this restrictive assumption. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 9 
are substitutes) have been invoked to generate a positive money demand; alternatively 
and for the same purpose, real money balances have been directly embedded either 
(iii) in the utility function (hence, MiU approach to introducing money in GE models) 
or (iv) in the production function (sometimes referred to as money-as-intermediate-
input approach). CiA versus MiU approaches to justifying a role for money in general 
equilibrium have been for some time lively debated, as they were often found to imply 
different analytical results and so, potentially, different policy recommendations, until 
Feenstra (1986) demonstrated their equivalence within a certain class of widely used 
models. 
Finally, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991) and a large subsequent literature have 
delved into a deeper dimension of modeling monetary economies in a coherent way, 
beyond the ‘shortcuts’ rescuing money in GE and into the microeconomics of what 
has become known as search or random-matching models of money (1.5 in the 
diagram). The search literature focuses on formally microfounding money (and, thus, 
money demand) in GE and is, for that reason, classified in the non-intersecting region 
of circle 1. This may, however, be somewhat misleading insofar search models often 
come up with conclusions about the ‘optimal monetary policy’. Nevertheless, 
characterizing the latter is not their main or direct objective, neither policy is derived 
within a relatively rich and realistic institutional set-up: so far it has been rare for 
these models, as Kocherlakota (2005) also points out, to go beyond other assets than 
money and into explicit modeling of the money supply process or its interactions with 
seignorage, taxation and other public finance issues. 
Our analysis does not attempt to separate out what is sometimes called models of 
exogenous money, where money allocation is random or where the central bank 
controls perfectly the supply of money, versus models of endogenous money, where 
the supply of money arises endogenously, which is then adjusted accordingly and 
automatically to the demand for money to simply generate equilibrium in the money 
market. Even under systematic monetary policy there may be exogenous components, 
e.g. due to money velocity shifts or imperfect monetary control, which the empirical 
vector autoregression (VAR) approach has in fact employed in identifying monetary 
policy shocks. On the other hand, monetary policy can be neither purely exogenous, 
nor fully controlled, as the central bank responds only imperfectly to the current or 
expected future state of the economy, which has in turn provided rationale for the Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 10 
theories and estimation of policy reaction functions. Real Business Cycle (RBC) 
models have ignored the role of money altogether as irrelevant. 
3.2 Monetary Policy 
The key differences in the set of assumptions between what we referred to as 
monetary theory and monetary policy (both potentially including aspects of public 
finance) have been summarized in a lucid way by Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006): 
“Simplifying assumptions facilitate the argument; in particular, it is often appropriate (1) to 
take for granted, and do not attempt to explain, the prevalence of monetary transactions, of 
exchanges of goods for money, and model the liquidity services of money balances as cash-in-
advance constraints; (2) to restrict attention to fiat money, a zero-coupon bond of infinite 
maturity, whose quantity and value are not linked to any other commodity or asset, but for 
equilibrium relations; (3) to postulate, in a first instance, a complete asset market, so as to 
focus on money as a medium of exchange, independently of its role for purposes of 
intertemporal transfers of revenues and, possibly, insurance.”, Bloise and Polemarchakis (p. 
2). 
Strangely enough, it is rare indeed to find monetary theory and monetary policy 
integrated or at least considered alongside in the same work. The surveys by Wallace 
(2001), Wright (2005), Kocherlakota (2005) or Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006) 
almost completely ignore
5 coverage of the themes and methods we classify in our 
monetary policy core field. Likewise, overviews from the ‘other camp’, such as those 
by Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), or Woodford 
(2003), tend to largely (if not absolutely) neglect the more ‘fundamental’ issues 
related to justification of the existence of money in competitive GE, i.e. monetary 
theory proper (1.5 in our diagram). Obviously, the disregard of each of those 
literatures to the other is reciprocal. A rare recent exception, at least in the title, is 
Lagos and Wright (2005); in essence, though, what the latter authors understand to be 
monetary policy is not what the mainstream nowadays Neo-Wicksellian or New 
Keynesian approach to the theory of monetary policy, e.g. expounded in the books by 
Woodford (2003) or Galí (2008), also defines and studies. In the remainder of this 
                                                 
5 Unless to mention imperfections in the ‘short-cut’ approach to just accepting money, not 
‘fundamentally’ proving its raison d’être. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 11 
subsection we sketch just a few among the numerous topics and methods in the 
literature on optimal monetary policy.
6 
The earliest, rather informal accounts of how monetary policy should be conducted 
relate to the practice of central banking and the corresponding debates on the 
appropriate monetary standard (or nominal anchor, in a modern sense). Discursive 
analysis of what is termed today stabilization policy has become more active once the 
gold standard (1776–1914) and, recently, the Bretton-Woods system (1944–1971) of 
fixed and convertible (into gold) parities between pairs of national currencies have 
been abandoned. Fisher (1896, 1911, 1923, 1930) and Wicksell (1898, 1907) are early 
classics, to which Khan, King and Wolman (2003) and Woodford (2003), 
respectively, have paid due tribute. Keynes’s (1936) General Theory is another 
seminal work, which has given birth to macroeconomics. Hicks (1937) has 
ingenuously condensed the key messages of Keynes’s book in the simple analytical 
and graphical apparatus
7 that has dominated academic and policy debates for almost 
half a century, the well-known IS-LM model. 
Such macroeconomic stabilization topics have somewhat later, following World War 
II, been refined and conceptualized, mostly in terms of (long-run or ultimate) goals 
(called also targets and implying respective strategies of formulation) and (short-term 
or operating) instruments (called also tools and enabling relevant tactics for 
implementation) of monetary policy (2.1 in Figure 1). Tinbergen (1952) and Theil 
(1961, 1964) constitute the first authoritative formal treatment of economic policy. 
The development of dynamic programming by Bellman (1957) and followers and of 
optimal control by Pontryagin and colleagues (1962), as well as Muth’s (1961) 
rational expectations (RE) formulation have further contributed to the methodological 
enhancement of earlier economic models and econometric approaches. Following 
work by Lucas (1972, 1976) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), applications of RE have 
become popular in the core fields of monetary economics we discuss here, together 
with applications of the theory of games developed by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944). Strategic interactions (in the 1980s) and incentive-contract 
                                                 
6 Our own perspective on the new consensus recommending constrained policy discretion is developed 
in a companion paper, Arestis and Mihailov (2007). The references therein orient into the huge related 
literature. 
7 The ‘hydraulic’ model was considered to oversimplify Keynes’s (1936) theory, and as “a retreat back 
inside the orthodox citadel” (Davidson, 2005, p. 451). Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 12 
aspects (in the 1990s), to which we return later, have gradually been added to the 
optimal monetary policy problem, bringing in more realism and further developments.  
These involve several dimensions, the most important ones being reflected in Figure 
1. Kydland and Prescott (1977) established the dominance of rules over discretion 
(2.2 in Figure 1) because of the ‘time-inconsistency’ problem, implying ex-post 
incentives for a government to use ‘surprise inflation’ to reduce the real value of any 
outstanding fiat money, as Calvo (1978) pointed out, and what Barro and Gordon 
(1983 a) called ‘inflationary bias’ of discretion (potentially, under the influence of 
interfering politicians). Repeated interaction was seen by Barro and Gordon (1983 b) 
as a solution to the inflationary bias via the build up of reputation and, hence, 
credibility. The rules versus discretion debate led to the institution-design literature, 
launched in the monetary policy area perhaps by Lohmann (1992). It evolved into 
targeting rules as a particular modern type of a monetary regime. Such inflation(-
forecast) targeting frameworks were initially adopted in the early 1990s, with 
Svensson (1997 a, b) and Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) being among the first 
academics to embrace, formally justify and popularize this new fashion in central 
banking. A growing number of papers and books has been accumulating since then, 
particularly within the empirical New Keynesian models (2.3 in Figure 1), presented 
exhaustively in Galí (2008), or the theoretical Neo-Wicksellian paradigm (2.4 in 
Figure 1), expounded coherently in Woodford (2003).  
This New Keynesian or Neo-Wicksellian research essentially justified the flexible 
variant of inflation targeting, i.e. when the central bank responds to an output gap 
measure in addition to the (forecast) inflation gap relative to the inflation target, as the 
optimal monetary policy. Forecast-based targeting also allows for judgment to 
‘adjust’ the conclusions from a number of alternative models central bankers use in 
decision making. There has not been so far a case where a country would abandon an 
inflation targeting framework, similarly to abandoning other monetary strategies in 
the past such as exchange-rate pegs or money growth guidelines. This fact itself 
speaks eloquently in favor of inflation targeting, yet it may be premature to deny any 
potential drawbacks of the apparently successful recent monetary regime. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 13 
3.3 Public Finance 
The public finance core field in our classification scheme of monetary economics at 
large can be, in essence, identified by its joint consideration of both monetary and 
fiscal policies in their interdependence.
8 The modern, dynamic reinterpretations in 
Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) of the classic Ramsey (1927) problem of 
statically choosing optimal taxation brought the broader public finance literature, and 
in particular the strand within it focusing on the inflation tax, into optimal policy 
analysis. Since the early 1980s this approach has dominated GE macroeconomic 
models. Related work on the optimal monetary-fiscal mix could broadly be subdivided 
into (at least) four major strands.
9 
The original public finance literature (3.1 in Figure 1) begins with Ramsey (1927) on 
optimal taxation, Friedman (1948) on the role of policy for economic stability and 
Barro (1979) on the concept of Ricardian equivalence. The latter hypothesis implies 
that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is always satisfied, which 
Sargent (1982) terms a Ricardian regime, also described by Leeper (1991) as 
monetary dominance, because monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive. 
Differently from the initial set-ups where only lump-sum transfers were assumed 
available and where the Friedman rule was found optimal, later research extended the 
so-called Ramsey problem of choosing the socially desirable policy by adding 
distortionary taxes and other assets in addition to money and bonds. 
Most of the subsequent work follows the mathematical, optimization-based Ramsey 
approach that has become increasingly detailed and sophisticated over the years. 
Major papers in that line of research (3.2 in Figure 1) include Lucas and Stokey 
(1983), Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987, 2006), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe 
(1991), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004 a, b, 2007), Benigno 
and Woodford (2003, 2006). All of these derive in a model-specific context certain 
optimal fiscal and monetary policy and, sometimes, also analyze the implied degree 
of monetary-fiscal coordination. Alternative approaches evolving since the 1980s 
                                                 
8 Note, however, that a large body of the recent New Keynesian literature still largely ignores such 
interactions, mostly for reasons of tractability. 
9 It should be pointed out that our overview of the public finance literature here focuses on the more 
conventional and more closely related to monetary economics dynamic Ramsey approach to optimal 
taxation, including in particular the inflation tax. These models assume a representative agent, a 
benevolent government and availability of a credible commitment technology. Of course, the opposite 
assumptions of heterogeneous agents, political-economy strategic games and discretion are subject to 
ongoing explorations in various fields, to some of which we return in section 3. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 14 
have often considered the optimal monetary-fiscal mix within game-theoretic work on 
strategic interaction, policy conflict, coordination failures and, hence, the need for 
coordinated actions if policy effectiveness is to be increased, e.g. in Nordhaus (1994). 
Modern treatments extend further into the design of optimal incentive schemes, which 
could be thought of as contracts or institutions. Separation and delegation of powers 
from a principal to an agent and the related incentive-compatibility design and 
enforceability with view to some social optimum have been the key issues of focus in 
such studies.
10 
A third strand (3.3 in our diagram), concentrating on how fiscal policy ultimately 
plays a crucial role in determining the price level, could be classified under its usual 
label, the fiscal theory of the price level (or FTPL). Its major proponents are Leeper 
(1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994, 1995) while McCallum (1999, 2001, 2003) 
and Buiter (1999, 2002) figure among its persistent critics. Notably, with Ricardian 
equivalence, McCallum and Nelson (2006) have claimed that monetary-fiscal 
coordination does not matter at all. 
A fourth line of public finance literature (3.4 in Figure 1), particularly in the 1970s 
and the 1980s but also nowadays, has progressively developed more and more 
sophisticated overlapping-generations (OLG) models with money and has applied 
them to public policy and social security systems. Works widely cited in this subfield 
include Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999), 
among others. 
Certainly, a lot is to be expected from future research at the intersection of optimal 
monetary and fiscal policies. In particular, Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006) claim 
that a solution to the conundrum by Hahn (1965) concerning the difficulty to generate 
a positive price for money in GE has been found in alternative formulations by Drèze 
and Polemarchakis (2000) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2006) where both policies 
are explicitly modeled. 
4. Recent Extensions of Monetary Economics 
To put our attempt at a compact systematization in perspective, we next selectively 
sketch the rationale, main approaches and key results of the most influential recent 
                                                 
10 These aspects are also well represented in the literature on monetary policy separately from fiscal 
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and likely future trends of research in monetary economics. Our exposition continues 
to follow the logic of Figure 1, but now we concentrate on the rectangles in its right-
hand side. As noted, the topics and methods listed as ingredients of these rectangles 
are in fact nowadays permeating all three core fields by providing relevant extensions 
and intersections within and across them.
11 
4.1 Richer Heterogeneity and Complexity (A in Figure 1) 
Traditional models of monetary economies have remained until very recently limited 
within theoretical frameworks postulating a representative agent. Advances in 
computing have, however, eliminated the necessity of such simplification. More and 
more research has, consequently, engaged in modeling and simulating heterogeneity 
and complexity of various forms.
12 
The earliest and simplest forms of heterogeneous agents in monetary models appear to 
have been the overlapping-generations (OLG) models, where old and young 
generations interact (e.g. Samuelson, 1958), as well as search models of money where 
agents with money, willing to buy goods, interact with agents without money, willing 
to sell endowments (e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). In both frameworks 
heterogeneity is reduced to only two types of agents. But these limitations have 
gradually been addressed by introducing further complexities (A.1 in Figure 1). Of 
particular relevance for monetary (and financial) models with positive and normative 
implications has been to study different kinds of informational asymmetries. These 
are often related to ways of learning, updating and forecasting or to other boundedly 
rational ways to acquire, process and use information (D in Figure 1) under 
uncertainty or ambiguity (F in Figure 1) by various agents and institutional sectors, 
including the central bank. We briefly review some of these concepts and results in 
the narrower contexts of the respective subsections further down. 
                                                 
11 Describing in more detail the multiple aspects of the ongoing developments within this literature 
goes far beyond the purpose of the present study, but checking the papers quoted further down and the 
references therein would provide a good starting point for a deeper exploration. 
12 Present day computationally intensive algorithms allow efficient modeling of diverse interactions 
between agents and groups of agents that are heterogeneous across a considerable number of 
dimensions. For more on these developments and in a context much more general than that of monetary 
economies, including interactions of complex social or markets systems with evolutionary and 
computational algorithms related to physics, biology or neuroscience, one could refer to Ríos-Rull 
(1999), Markose (2005), Blume and Durlauf (2006), Gilbert (2007), Fagiolo, Moneta and Windrum 
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We may note at this point that A.2 in Figure 1 is a particular implementation of richer 
heterogeneity with distributional implications, also incorporating individual as well as 
aggregate uncertainty yet simple enough to be analytically tractable. More 
importantly, this line of research proposed by Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning 
(2006) under the brand of new dynamic public finance and as extension to Mirrlees 
(1971) has provided a novel alternative to the Ramsey approach in public finance 
outlined earlier. One rationale for it has been to relax the assumption of exogenously 
given tax instruments in the Ramsey framework. The new dynamic public finance 
thus studies endogenous tax instruments whose purpose is to redistribute across 
agents heterogeneous in their skills and risk attitudes under private information. 
Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning (2006) derive a two-period ‘workhorse’ model of 
this kind and provide an overview of the field, challenging three of the standard 
results obtained in Ramsey set-ups. First, instead of recommending not to tax capital 
in the long run (e.g. as in Judd, 1985 and Chamley, 1986), it is argued that introducing 
an implicit distortion in savings to discourage them is optimal. Second, perfect labor 
income tax smoothing (e.g. as in Barro, 1979 and Lucas and Stokey, 1983) is not 
optimal either when agents have uncertain and evolving skills. Third, the nature of the 
time-consistency problem changes as well. 
4.2 Game-Theoretic and Coordination Issues (B in Figure 1) 
There are, broadly speaking, two strands of the game-theoretic and coordination 
literature that are closely related to topics in monetary economics. Both address 
optimal policy. However, one of them limits attention to strategic interactions 
between policymakers and the private sector or to coordination issues between fiscal 
and monetary policy within the same national economy, i.e. this is a problem of 
choosing and implementing the optimal macroeconomic policy mix. The other strand 
transfers the implications of strategic policies and social welfare spillovers beyond 
national borders, thus studying the international aspects of monetary and/or fiscal 
policy coordination. In this subsection we only give a flavor for the major results 
along each of these two dimensions, inviting the interested reader to go deeper into 
the works referenced in and referencing our two hopefully representative illustrations 
below. 
In a domestic economy context (B.1 in Figure 1), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), among 
others, analyze monetary-fiscal interactions when the monetary authority is more Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 17 
conservative than the fiscal authority. Their main finding is that joint commitment of 
the monetary and fiscal authorities achieves the social optimum, which they term ‘the 
second best’, the ‘first best’ being attainable only if a production subsidy financed by 
per-head taxes neutralizes the distortion of monopolistic competition in their model. 
Commitment of one of the authorities under discretion of the other is an inferior 
outcome. If no commitment is possible, the second best could be implemented in two 
alternative ways: either by assigning identical targets; or by completely separating the 
targets of the fiscal and monetary authorities, to avoid conflict of interest. 
Building upon earlier work (including their own: Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001), Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2005), among others, develop a baseline GE model of optimal monetary 
policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal 
rigidities (B.2 in Figure 1). They find that an inward-looking policy of domestic price 
stabilization is not optimal when firms’ mark-ups are exposed to currency 
fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to 
charge higher prices when facing increased uncertainty in the export market. As 
higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal 
monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. 
Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative 
to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not 
suffer from any inflationary bias. A key conclusion is that gains from international 
monetary cooperation are related in a nonmonotonic way to the degree of exchange 
rate pass-through. 
4.3 Banking Sector, Macro-Finance and Financial Innovation (C in Figure 1) 
Recent research in monetary economics has increasingly become interested in 
modeling explicitly a banking sector, macro-finance links and/or financial innovation. 
Earlier PE or GE monetary models have usually abstracted away from such realistic 
details. In this subsection we opt to illustrate two major strands of such work. 
A first strand stresses the importance of financial intermediation, extending in various 
ways the microfounded but simple bank run set-up of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). 
Many papers have focused on modeling or estimating the credit channel of monetary 
policy transmission and the effects of liquidity or limited-participation constraints of 
agents in credit markets. Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992) developed and tested a Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 18 
model where in addition to the standard, money channel (e.g. in earlier Keynesian or 
monetarist frameworks) a second, credit channel is operative. The money channel 
works via banking-sector liabilities (deposits), while the credit channel affects 
banking-sector assets (loans). The microeconomic justification Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988, 1992) suggest for the credit channel is that banks acquire expertise in screening 
loan projects and monitoring loan performance, which allows them to extend credit to 
customers unable to obtain credit in the financial market. Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1996) provided early evidence from VARs based on the flow of funds 
accounts of the household sector in the US in favor of such limited-participation 
constraints that were being built within monetary business cycle models.
13 Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) further argued that worsening of the credit market 
conditions following adverse shocks can amplify the effects of these shocks on the 
economy, a mechanism they denote as the ‘financial accelerator’.
14 One major 
difficulty in modeling credit in addition to money when the latter is essential in the 
sense of Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001), i.e. when its use expands the sets 
of allocations, is that credit requires record-keeping while money not. To address this 
problem and incorporate banking within a search framework, Berentsen, Camara and 
Waller (2007) extend the divisible money model of Lagos and Wright (2005) by 
introducing financial intermediation (C.1 in Figure 1). They find that, in general, 
financial intermediation improves the allocation and that the gains in welfare arise 
from the payment of interest on deposits, not from relaxing the liquidity constraints of 
borrowers. A novel result is also that increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare 
improving when credit rationing occurs in their model. 
Another strand of the monetary literature has shifted the focus towards trying to 
understand the consequences of financial innovation. Since the late 1960s, concerns 
have increasingly been expressed in academia and policy circles that financial 
innovation, which spurred with the deregulation of banking and the advance of 
computing technologies, may have led to the break-up of econometric relationships 
among monetary aggregates and macroeconomic variables, e.g. between narrow 
                                                 
13 This assumption more precisely means that households cannot adjust their financial assets and 
liabilities immediately after a monetary shock. 
14 Studies along these lines in the past decade have also dealt with the implications of adverse selection 
and moral hazard as major problems of asymmetric information which financial intermediation was 
meant to mitigate. Another related literature that has often become referred to as macro-finance 
integrates asset price dynamics in financial markets and, in particular, the term and risk structure of 
interest rates into theoretical or empirical models of monetary policy. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 19 
money and the price level. This was important insofar it affected the forecastability 
and controllability of the economy by the central bank. Moreover, the abundant 
spread and use of non-cash money across the globe by the late 1990s has led to 
debates on the trend towards cashless societies where credit and debit cards replace 
paper currency as well as on the impact of financial innovation (coupled with 
globalization) on inflation dynamics and monetary control. It is paradoxical to note 
that the dominant approach to monetary policy today has gone that far so as to deny 
the role of money in monetary policy. The motivation consists in the (alleged) 
theoretical inferiority of monetary aggregates to the respective interest rates as 
instruments of monetary policy and apparently reflects the trends towards 
cashlessness in the real world. This Neo-Wicksellian approach is most convincingly 
represented by what is termed ‘models without money’ or a ‘cashless economy’ (C.2 
in Figure 1) in the sense of Woodford (1998, 2003). He has notably argued that 
money is not essential to modeling the effects of monetary policy under sticky prices, 
insofar these are transmitted via an interest-rate feedback rule which responds 
optimally to inflation and output gap forecasts summarizing the state of the economy. 
4.4 Bounded Rationality, Learning and Rational Inattention (D in Figure 1) 
We next only give a flavor for the main issues and findings of the huge and active 
literature at the intersection of bounded rationality with monetary economics. 
A first, widely exploited approach at present relates learnability of equilibrium to 
policy feedback, as we briefly explain. Since Taylor (1993) reaction functions which 
specify how the monetary authority should set (ex ante), or has actually set (ex post), 
a short-term interest rate instrument in response to the present or expected future state 
of the economy has received much attention in the monetary policy literature. 
Empirical work has attempted to verify the positive perspective of simple Taylor-type 
rules for various countries and periods and with varying degree of success. The 
theoretical literature has, in turn, studied the properties of simpler or more 
complicated versions of instrument and related targeting rules from a normative 
perspective. In particular, the main concern has been that such rules intended to 
optimally guide the conduct of monetary policy and, as a consequence, to serve the 
crucial function of anchoring inflationary expectations should be carefully designed 
so as not to introduce additional instability in the economy. Accordingly, analytical 
work has examined extensively the existence, uniqueness and dynamic stability of Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 20 
rational-expectations equilibria (REE) within the basic frameworks employed in 
modeling the effects of monetary policy. The study of real determinacy under a 
boundedly rational process of learning by agents, usually Bayesian (D.1 in Figure 1), 
has led to the concept of expectational stability (E-stability or learnability) of REE, 
introduced in Evans (1985) and expounded within broader context in Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001, 2003 a, b).  
Along these lines, Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider interest-rate rules in a closed-
economy REE model and show that if monetary policy is sufficiently aggressive the 
economy has an equilibrium that is not only unique but also learnable. ‘Sufficiently 
aggressive’ means consistent with the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ (see Woodford, 
2001 referring to Taylor, 1999), which states that the central bank should increase its 
(nominal) interest rate instrument by more than one-to-one following an increase in 
(expected) inflation.
15 Bullard and Mitra (2007) furthermore investigate the 
consequences of policy inertia modeled as an interest-rate smoothing term in the 
standard Taylor rule equation, and find that this can increase the learnability of 
equilibrium. Llosa and Tuesta (2007) extend Bullard and Mitra (2002) to a small open 
economy (SOE), building as well upon the SOE set-up in Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
Their key finding is that, contrary to Bullard and Mitra (2002), expectations-based 
rules that involve the CPI and/or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of E-
stability and the Taylor principle does not guarantee E-stability.
16 They also show that 
some forms of managed exchange rate rules can alleviate problems of both 
indeterminacy and expectational instability, yet these rules might not be desirable 
since they promote greater volatility in the economy. 
Bullard and Schaling (2006) examine how determinacy and learnability of 
‘worldwide’ REE may be affected by monetary policy in a simple two-country New 
Keynesian framework under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. The main result is 
that open-economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and 
learnability relative to closed-economy analyses, and that new concerns can arise 
                                                 
15 I.e. that the coefficient to inflation in the monetary policy reaction function should be higher than 
unity, to ensure an increase in the real interest rate that helps reduce aggregate demand and, ultimately, 
the initial inflationary pressure. 
16 De Fiore and Liu (2005) and McKnight and Mihailov (2007) find analogous results concerning 
determinacy of REE in a SOE CiA model and in a two-country MiU model with nonseparability 
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when exploring classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and 
monetary policy cooperation. 
A second strand of monetary literature that builds upon bounded rationality is related 
to the notion of rational inattention (D.2 in Figure 1), introduced in economics by 
Sims (2003). Kasa (2006) presents a succinct background to this research, initiated by 
Shannon (1948) in the field of information theory. The key contribution of Shannon 
(1948) has been to view information as a stochastic process and quantify it in terms of 
the conditional probability distribution generating the data. He defined an information 
transmission channel as a mapping between inputs (e.g. a sound or signal) and 
observed outputs (what is heard or perceived, isolating the accompanying additive 
‘noise’ as much as possible), and the capacity of such a channel as the maximum rate 
at which signals can be transmitted with a small detection error. Sims (2003) applied 
Shannon’s (1948) concepts to describe individuals as finite capacity information 
transmission channels. He went on to stress that, if so, measurement error is 
unavoidable and rational, due to the constraints of the human brain to collect and 
process the information relevant in decision making. The problem of an economic 
agent is, hence, to minimize the sum of squared forecast errors subject to a lower 
bound on the variance of the measurement error decreasing with a given processing 
capacity. In such a context, rational inattention could be optimal: agents are 
‘inattentive’ to small shocks in the sense that they ignore or do not react to them, and 
adjust their behavior only to bigger shocks, whenever the latter occur. Studying 
economic interactions that involve rational inattention is currently an active agenda, in 
particular in monetary and financial applications. 
4.5 Incentives, Contracts and Mechanism Design (E in Figure 1) 
Athey, Atkinson and Kehoe (2005) have broadly denoted the type of literature we 
consider in the present subsection as legislative approach to monetary policy. It has 
grown out of the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983 a, b) as well as the well-known extensions of Canzoneri (1985), Rogoff (1985), 
Lohmann (1992) and Walsh (1995), among others. However, the legislative approach 
differs from the one in the early literature on rules versus discretion, as does too the 
implied notion of discretion. The early literature assumes that society has no 
mechanism for committing to rules governing monetary policy, while the legislative 
approach, deemed more appealing for advanced economies, solves this dynamic Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 22 
mechanism design problem. The papers we cited as well as recent work along similar 
lines
17 usually propose incentive schemes or contracts written between society and its 
representatives (parliaments and governments), on the one hand, and elected 
policymakers or appointed expert institutions (e.g. a central bank or a monetary policy 
committee), on the other, that are often viewed as institutional frameworks for 
policymaking. It is natural in this context to also think of the standard principal-agent 
problem and of certain mandates of policy delegation, hence, of issues of 
independence, transparency and accountability (E.1 in Figure 1). 
A concise description of the general methodology of the legislative approach to 
monetary policy is provided in Athey, Atkinson and Kehoe (2005). It is assumed that 
society designs the optimal rules governing the conduct of monetary policy by the 
monetary authority via an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the 
random state of the economy. The monetary authority observes the state, while 
individual agents do not. Well designed rules trade off society’s desire to give the 
monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against society’s need 
to prevent that authority from giving in to the temptation to stimulate the economy 
with unexpected inflation, the time inconsistency problem. The solution the authors 
suggest to this apparently complex dynamic mechanism design problem (E.2 in 
Figure 1) is simple, and consists in legislating an inflation cap. The optimal degree of 
monetary policy discretion then shrinks as the severity of the time inconsistency 
problem increases relative to the importance of private information. In an economy 
with a severe time inconsistency problem and unimportant private information, 
commitment is optimal. 
4.6 Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Robust Control (F in Figure 1) 
The main rationale for introducing techniques of robust control in economic modeling 
and policy evaluation has been the acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of 
uncertainty in real-world economies and decision making. Its purpose has been the 
enhancement of optimal control methods, mostly deterministic until recently, used in 
studying macrodynamics and formulating policy, by more complex features involving 
uncertainty or ambiguity and the ensuing robust control approaches to economic 
policy in a stochastic environment, pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007). 
                                                 
17 See, for example, the various formalizations in Beetsma and Bovenberg (2005), Castellani and 
Debrun (2005), Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006), Mihailov and Ullrich (2007); or Blinder (1997) and 
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Hansen and Sargent (2007) begin their book by stating: “Classical and modern control 
theory supplied perfect tools for applying Muth’s (1961) concept of rational 
expectations to a variety of problems in dynamic economics” (p. 3). But more recently 
concerns about model misspecification, i.e. model uncertainty, led to extending these 
methods to robust control and estimation. Their contribution with this book, as they 
describe it concisely, is to extend robust control theory and estimation from 
engineering and physics into economics. 
As early as Brainard (1967), economists have been attempting to appropriately 
characterize optimization problems that policymakers are bound to solve under 
uncertainty, distinguishing two types: (i) uncertainty about the impact of the 
realization of a shock on a single-variable target (F.1 in Figure 1), a type of 
uncertainty usually termed just uncertainty (or risk, in finance) or shock uncertainty 
(usually of an additive functional form, hence, additive uncertainty) in the recent 
research on robust control; and (ii) about the response parameter in the policy 
feedback model (F.2 in Figure 1), now called parameter uncertainty (of a 
multiplicative form, hence, multiplicative uncertainty). Two other types of uncertainty 
that are widely employed at present, including in work on optimal monetary policy 
are: (iii) the so-called model uncertainty, i.e. when the researcher has more than one 
model of the economy and is not certain which one of them is the ‘true’ model (F.3 in 
Figure 1); and (iv) what was known until very recently as Knightean uncertainty, after 
Knight (1921), but is now synonymously referred to instead as ambiguity, when the 
researcher is not able to assign even subjective probabilities to all possible stochastic 
events, so that he does not know (completely) the set of possible outcomes of one or 
more shock processes (F.4 in Figure 1). The earlier literature concerning decisions 
under uncertainty of type (i) above, i.e. such that has nothing to do with the actions of 
the policymaker, had commonly prescribed certainty-equivalence behavior, meaning 
that “the policy maker should act on the basis of expected values as if he were certain 
they would actually occur” (Brainard, 1967, p. 413). 
More recent work has extended this prescription in various directions, and depending 
on the sophistication of the models involved. Novel monetary policy research on all 
these – and other
18 – types of uncertainty is currently very active, and likely to remain 
                                                 
18 For example, information uncertainty and such related to combining information (e.g. observation 
window, disaggregate information, role of judgement) or measurement uncertainty (e.g. real time 
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so in the future. We close our discussion by an indicative illustration below of the 
major issues in a few recent and influential papers. 
Among many others, Onatski and Williams (2003) have pointed out that the policy 
implications of uncertainty are strongly dependent on the underlying assumptions of 
how it is modeled. They have developed methods to analyze parameter uncertainty, in 
particular, concluding that the aggressiveness found in robust policy rules
19 is likely 
to be caused by overemphasizing uncertainty about economic dynamics at low 
frequencies. Building on this work, Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005) use 
a microfounded macroeconometric modeling framework to investigate the design of 
monetary policy when the central bank is uncertain about the true structure of the 
economy. They apply Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the baseline 
specification using post-war US data, and then determine the policy under 
commitment that maximizes household welfare. The main result is that the 
performance of the optimal policy is closely matched by a simple operational rule that 
focuses solely on stabilizing nominal wage inflation.
20 Giannoni (2007) adopts an 
extended framework where the policymaker faces uncertainty about model parameters 
and shock processes. The robust optimal policy rule in his forward-looking model, 
then, is likely to involve a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in 
inflation and the output gap than in the absence of uncertainty. Thus, parameter 
uncertainty alone does not necessarily justify a weak response of monetary policy to 
perturbations, as found by some of the previous literature.
21  
Svensson and Williams (2008) go further in examining alternative monetary policies 
under a relatively general form of model uncertainty, so-called Markov jump-linear-
quadratic systems extended to include forward-looking variables.
22 They provide an 
algorithm for finding the optimal policy as well as solutions for arbitrary policy 
functions, which allows computing and plotting consistent distribution forecasts – fan 
charts – of target variables and instruments. These methods extend certainty 
                                                 
19 E.g. by Craine (1979), Sargent (1999) or Söderström (2002). 
20 Furthermore, this simple wage stabilization rule is remarkably robust to uncertainty about the model 
parameters and to various assumptions regarding the nature and incidence of the innovations. However, 
the characteristics of optimal policy are very sensitive to the specification of the wage contracting 
mechanism, thereby highlighting the importance of additional research regarding the structure of labor 
markets and wage determination. 
21 E.g. Brainard (1967), Rudebusch (2001) or Ellison, Sarno and Vilmunen (2007). 
22 This form encompasses simple i.i.d. model deviations, serially correlated model deviations, 
estimable regime-switching models, and more complex structural uncertainty about very different 
models, e.g. backward- and forward-looking models or time-varying central-bank judgment about the 
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equivalence and ‘mean forecast targeting’ to more general certainty non-equivalence 
and ‘distribution forecast targeting’. Finally, Kasa (2006) models robust control and 
rational inattention jointly. He claims that when considered separately these two 
features are observationally equivalent: a higher filter gain can be interpreted either as 
an increased preference for robustness or as an increased ability to process 
information. If considered simultaneously, he argues that an increased preference for 
robustness can be interpreted as an increased demand for information processing, 
whereas rational inattention models like the one in Sims (2003) can be interpreted as 
placing a constraint on the available supply. Kasa (2006) concludes that the way 
agents actually implement robust decision rules is by allocating some of their scarce 
capacity to process information to problems with high degree of model uncertainty 
and sensitivity to risk. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of the present paper is to propose a compact systematic ordering of the 
major fields and methods in the subject area of monetary economics. In doing so, we 
have also strived to summarize selectively yet representatively (insofar possible) the 
rationale, approaches and findings of the most influential past and recent trends in this 
literature. Notably, we made an attempt to compress the logic of our classification into 
a straightforward referential diagram. The diagram comprised three fundamental 
fields, monetary theory, monetary policy, and public finance, and highlighted six 
areas of current research, expanding within and across the fundamental fields. The 
elements of our scheme are not found altogether and in their mutual relationships in 
earlier studies, neither are attempts for a simple but relatively complete 
systematization. Such a task is, no doubt, challenging, and we do not claim here 
exhaustiveness or finality. Our intention is rather to take stock of this active and 
diverse field by suggesting a synthetic viewpoint. We hope in this way to stimulate an 
improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary 
economics at large. Arestis and Mihailov (June 2008), Classifying Monetary Economics 26 
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